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Of the many factors shaping the boundaries of state and society in the 
United States, few are mOre elusive than corporate philanthropy. 1 In subtle 
and sometimes paradoxical ways, corporate ghilanthropy has influenced 
not only the making of public policy but also the framing of credible gener-
alizations about the role of governmental institutions in the American past. 
Many business leaders resented the regulatory legislation that was a defining 
feature of Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal and deplored the enthusiastic 
embrace of this legislation by prominent academics. In ~esponse, probusi-
ness lobbyists launched a wide array of initi3tives to roll back the New DeaL 
One landmark in this anti-New Deal crusade occurred in 1971, when, in a 
pointed memorandum for the US Chamber of Commerce, future Supreme 
Court justice Lewis PowellWarned that the professoriate had launched an 
"attack" on the "free enterprise system" and urged corporate leaders to fight 
back by bankrolling an intellectual counterestablishment.2 
This essay contends that this academic counteroffensive had been well 
underway by the time Powell prepared his memorandum, and that it has 
a more complicated lineage, and a less straightforward relationship with 
the professoriate, than is often supposed. Its theme is the establishment by 
corporate philanthropists at Harvard University in 1958 of a major research 
institute-the Center for the Study ofLiberty~to foster innovative scholar-
ship in American history. This institute was the brainchild of Arthur W. Page, 
a prominent public relations executive who, following his retirement as vice 
president for public relations at the telephone giant American Telephone 
and Telegraph, turned his attention to philanthropy. Page founded the 
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center to reorient American historical writing away from political economy, · 
a topic of compelling interest for the previous generation, and toward ciVil 
society, by which Page meant the working lives of the American people. The 
mainspring of the American experience, in Page's view, was, or ought to be 
social history and not political history. Unfortunately, American historian~ 
wrote far too much about politics, and, in particular, about the positive role 
of goveinmental institutions in regulatir,ig big business, and far too little 
about the everyday activities of ordinary _Americans. As a public relations 
specialist, Page recognized that public attitudes could be altered through the 
artful reframing of controversial issues. The Center for the Study of Liberty 
was the culmination of a long campaign to apply the time-tested techniques ' 
of public relations to the vvriting of American history. 
Political economy and civil society are, of course, not necessarily op-
posed. Both, for example, were favorite themes of the eighteenth-century 
Scottish Enlightenment social theorists who would prove so influential in 
the United States. For Page, however, as well as for his-allies in the business 
community, political economy and civil society had come bythemid-1950s 
to be regarded as distinct and even antagonistic. 
Page's conception of social histqry originated in a very different intel-
lectual milieu from the environment that spawned the "new" social his-
tory,. a highly innovative style of historical scholarship that, in the United 
States, originated at the University of Wisconsin at around the same time 
that the Center for the Study of Liberty at Harvard opened its doors. The 
new social historians devoted particular attention to social movements that 
they presumed to be largely independent of the state.Jn the language of the 
day, they aspired to write history "from the bottom up." Among the phe-
nomena these historians found compelling were those social movements 
_that revealed the often neglected agency of marginalized groups, including 
women, blacks, and the poor.3 r 
The new social history had an avowedly liberal, and in some manifesta-
tions a programmatically radical, cast ¢at was supportive of civil rights, 
women's issues, and President Lyndon Johnson's War on Poverty. 
Page's social history had a different genealogy. The new social historians 
criticized political history as conventional and conservative. For Page, in 
contrast, political history was subversive and dangerous. Like many busi-
ness leaders, Page found disturbing the enthusiasm with which prominent 
historians were rewriting American history through the lens of Roosevelt's 
New Deal. Corporate philanthropy, in his view, could reverse this worri-
some trend by recalibrating the balance between political econOmy and civil 
society. 
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Page had a point. Much of the most influential historical vvri.ting on the 
United States in 1940s and 1950s had been broadly sympathetic to the ex-
pansion of the American state that had been catalyzed by the New Deal 
and augmented by the Second World War. Among the many historians to 
participate in this post-New Deal revisionism were Oscar Handlin, Arthur 
Schlesinger Jr., and Richard Hofstadter. Handlin's pro-New Deal sympa-
thies shone through in Commonwealth (1947), a richly detailed monograph, 
coauthored with his wife Mary, that documented the huge array of tasks the 
Massachusetts government performed in the early republic. Partial funding 
for Commonwealth came from the Social Science Research Council, a phil-
anthropic orga:iiization that had molinted a research lliitiative to investigate 
the role of government in American economic development in the period 
before Roosevelt came to power in 1933.4 Arthur Schlesinger Jr:s contribu-
tion to the revisionist canon i.nduded his Age of Jackson (1945), a Pulitzer 
Prize-ffinning interpretative survey of early nineteenth-century public life 
that helped to legitimate the New Deal by portraying the Jacksonians as the 
New Dealers' ideological ancestor. Schlesinger would go on to serve as a 
speechwriter for the Democra1:!c presidential contender Adlai Stephenson 
in 1952 and 1956; shortly thereafter, he published a massive, three-volume 
history of the United States betw'een 1921 and 1936 that voted for Roosevelt 
on every page. 5 -Hofstadter's revisionism was less pointed than Sdtlesinger' s, 
but no less sweeping. In his Pulitzer Prize-winning Age of Reform (1955), 
Hofstadter contended that the achievement of the New Deal lay in the 
extent to which it transcended the crippling limitations' of the earlier popu-
list and progressive movements with which it had so often been compared. 
Hofstadter was more explicitly critical of the pre-New Deal reform tradi-
tion than Handlin or Schlesinger; even so, he fully shared their conviction 
that political economy deserved a prominent place on the historian's 
agenda. 
For Page, this was all quite unsettling. Like many American business lead-
ers, Page ·opposed the recent expansion of the federal government as an as-
sault upon foundational civic ideals. Some of Page's colleagues mounted an 
ambitious advertising campaign to champion "free enterprise," a relatively 
new meme popularized following Roosevelt's_ landslide reelection in 1936 
to tilt public opinion against the New Deal.6 By1952, according to Fortune 
editor William H. Whyte Jr., the free enterprise. advertising campaign, which 
Whyte derided as a hopeless failure, was costing corporations $100 mil-
lion a year.' Although Page was himself a principled critic of the New Deal, 
he derided the free enterprise campaign as foolish and counterproductive 
and refused to permit it to be identified with American Telephone and 
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Telegraph. 8 To shift the boundaries between state and society, in his view, it 
wo-qld be far more productive to shape the outlook of the rising generation 
of historians. It would be overly simplistic to dismiss Page as a big-business 
apologist intent on making the world safe for the giant corporations that 
by mid century had come to dominate the American economy. Yet as Page's 
voluminous correspondence makes plain, there can be little doubt that in 
establishing the Center for the Study of Liberty at Harvard, he hoped to win 
in the history books a contest that corporate America had lost at the polls. 
Arthur W. Page was one of the most highly respected of the first generation 
of public relations practitioners in the United States. When Page entered 
the field in 1927, corporate public relations had yet to emerge as a distinct 
occupational specialty. By the time of Page's retirement in 1946, specialists 
in corporate public relations had become a fixture at many of the nation's 
leading corporations. Although Page was less well !mown than Ivy Lee or 
Edward L. Bernays, he may well have done more to shape the field. It was, 
for example, neither Bernays nor Lee, but Page, who devised the code of eth-
ics for public relations professionals-lmown as the 0 Page Prindplesn -that 
would long define best practice, and that remain influential today. 
Page's appointment at American Telephone and Telegraph was some-
thing of a landmark in the field. Never before had a public relations spedal-
ist obtained such a high-level appointment at a giant corporation. American 
Telephone and Telegraph was at this time the capstone of a vast telephone 
cartel, !mown as the "Bell System," or, colloquially, simply as Bell, that 
would dominate the provisioning of telephone service in the United States 
from the 1910s until its court-ordered breakup in 1984. Page remained at 
Bell for twenty years, making him one of the most prominent public rela-
tions executives in the country during the tumultuous epoch that spanned 
the Great Depression, the New Deal, and the Second World War. 
Outside of the field of publicrelations, Page is best !mown to posterity as 
the author of the 1,160-word statement that President Harry S. Truman re-
leased to the public in August 1945 following the detonation at Hiroshima 
of the first atomic bomb. The willingness of Truman's secretary of-war, 
Henry L. Stimson, to tap Page to craft this public statement testifies not 
only to Stimson's esteem for Page but also to the high regard the field of 
public relations had come by this time to enjoy. Few business leaders had a 
sounder grasp of the mainsprings of public opinion or of the myriad tech-
niques by which it could be shaped. 
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Like so many specialists in public relations, Page came to the field fol-
lowing a career as a journalist. Page's father, Walter Hines Page, had been 
the founder ~f World's Work, a highly successful New York City-based mass-
drculation magazine. Following Page's graduation from Harvard in the class 
of 1901, he joined the staff of his father's magazine, where he would remain 
for the next twenty-six years, first as a reporter, and beginning in 1913 as 
editor. World's Work provided Page with a laboratory in which he could ex-
periment with the framing of public issues. Unlike rival mass-market peri-
odicals Such as McClure's and Collier's, World's Work unabashedly celebrated 
the country's industrial might. While McClure's and Collier's ran muclaaking 
exposes of business misdeeds, World's Work celebrated American business 
achievements, establishing journalistic conventions that would later be-
come commonplace at Fortune and Business Week. ~age found these conven-
tions compelling. For the rest of his life, he would hail the "world's work" of 
the American people as an epic theme. 
Page's political outlook owed a good deal to his personal background. 
Born in North Carolina in 1883, he inherited from his father the nNew 
South" probusiness boosterism characteristic of progressive-minded south-
ern Democrats. Page's father had begun his career as a North Carolina 
newspaper editor, and like many progressive-minded southerners, was an 
enthusiastic backer of Woodrow Wilson, the first southerner to become a 
presidential contender since the Civil War. When Wilson won the presi-
dency in the election of 1912, Walter received an appointment as ambas-
sador to Great Britain. Arthur inherited his father's p'olitical identity. He 
backed the Democratic candidate in every presidential election until 1928, 
when he bolted the party to support Herbert Hoover against Al Smith. From 
that point onward, he would consistently vote Republican for the rest of his 
life.9 
Page1s interest in American history dated back at least as far as his under-
graduate years at Harvard. A history major, Page took Edward Channing's 
survey of the early American republic and Frederick Jackson Turner's lec-
ture course on the West. Neither seems to have made much of an impres-
sion . .Although Page frequently corresponded with memPers of the Harvard 
History Department in the 1950s, he never mentioned Channing and only 
mentioned Turner once, and that was in passing. Yet it may well not be coin-
ddental that two Turnerian themes-the abundance of cheap land and the 
contrasting social environment of the United.States and Europe-recurred 
repeatedly in virtually everything Page wrote about the American past. "In 
the settlement of America we have to observe how European life entered this 
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continent, and how America modified_ and developed that life and reacted on 
Europe," Turner proclaimed in.1893, in setting forth a position with which 
Page would have heartily concurre1: "The frontier is the line of most rapid 
and effective Americanization. The_wilderness masters the colonist."10 For 
Page, as for Turner, everyday experience held the key to the American past. 
Page's journalistic career ended fu 1927 when, at the personal request of 
Bell president Walter S. Gifford-who, as it happens, had been a classmate 
of Page's at Harvard-Page agreed to take a position at the telephone giant. 
The Bell System in the 1920; was widely.hailed as one of the best run 
and most socially progressiVe corp.9rations in the world. Beginning in 1907, 
with the appointment ofTheod9re N. Vail as its president, Bell managers 
endorsed publicity, financial transparency, state regulation-preferably 
via regulatory commissions rather than direct legislation-and what Vail 
called "universal service." By' universal service Vail meant more than the 
interconnection of all of the n·atlon' s telephones and the integration of the 
telephone and telegraph into· a single hybrid network. In addition, Vail envi-
sioned the gradual extension of local telephone service at reasonable cost to 
the entire population. 11 To_realize this ambitious goal, Bell managers substi-
tuted public service for the niaximiZation of the shareholders' return as their 
primary goal. This capacious mandate did much to diminish the influence 
of shareholders, the putative owners of a publicly held corporation like Bell, 
and would become a major ideological rationale for managerial capitalism, 
a business creed that gained widespread legitimacy during the First World 
War. In addition, it proved useful in staving off a threatened government 
takeover of the telephone giant during the 1930s.12 
Page had become familiatwith Vail's ideas as a staffer at WorldS Work and 
did his best to publicize them at Bell. In public statement after public state-
ment, Page articulated a rationale for universal service and corporate social 
responsibility. Oiily rqrely, however, did Page attribute these values to Vail 
himself. Instead, he identified them with Vail's successor, Walter S. Gifford. 
For Page, the proof text was an address on Bell policy that Gifford deliv-
ered in Dallas, Texas, in 1927, shortly after Page had joined the company. 
In this 'address, which Page often praised in later years, and which several 
insiders assumed Page had ghostwritten, Gifford reaffirmed Bell's commit-
ment to providing telephone service for the many as well as th€. few, while 
maintaining the highest standards of financial propriety. Despite the scale 
and scope of the Bell System, Gifford observed, the country boasted no tele-
phone millionaires, while shareholders received no "melons" in the form 
of excessive dividends. In Gifford's view-as well as Page's-Bell's fiscal con:-
servatism differentiated it from the railroad and telegraph empires that had 
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been cobbled ~ogether in late n~neteenth century by the notorious financial 
buccaneers William H. Vanderbilt and Jay Gould." 
Gifford's rhetoric was intended to forestall political opposition by iden-
tifying Bell with the public good. This strategy worked well in the prosper-
ous 1920s, yet it failed to shield Bell from hostile public scrutiny during 
the Great Depression. Bell's prospects looked particularly dire following the 
launch in 1935 by the Federal Communications Communication (FCC) of 
a massive investigation of Bell business practices. Lawmakers criticized Bell's 
cozy relationship with telephone equipment manufacturer Western Electric 
and blained Bell for suppressing a host of innovations in elecnical commu-
nications. Tellingly, even relatively sympathetic accounts of the corporate 
giant that were published around this time, such as Horace Coon's American 
Tel and Tel, felt obliged to remind the public that Bell was the "world's big-
gest monopoly" and the "largest single aggregation of capital ever controlled 
by a single company in the history of private business enterprise. "14 
Few events proved more influential in shaping Page's understanding 
of American history than the Bell-FCC set-to. The nadir for Page came in 
1938 with the drafting by FCC chairman Paul A. Walker of a highly critical 
preliminary report that recommended, among other things, that Congress 
grant the FCC the authority to rule on the propriety of every single major 
decision that Bell management made. Walker's draft report Was extremely 
controversial. In fact, it was so contentious that it was almost immediately 
superseded, at Bell's behest, by a report more sympathetic to the telephone 
giant. Even so, the Walker report demonstrated the vulnerability of Bell to 
hostile legislation, a lesson Page never forgot. 
The Walker report haunted Page, and he was determined to set the record 
straight. Page's rebuttal took the form of a book, The Bell Telephone System, 
published in 1941, in which he calmly and deliberately rebutted Walker's 
contention that federal administrators could operate the telephone network 
better than corporate managers. The level of telephone service that Bell pro-
vided its users, Page contended, was unmatched anywhere else in the world, 
because Bell was not a government agency, but a management-led corpora-
tion dedicated to public service. In his indictment on Bell's detractors, Page 
singled out for special condemnation various daiµis that FCC economist 
Noobar Danielan advanced in AT&T: The Story of Industrial Conquest-a 
trade book, published in 1939, that was based on information the FCC 
investigation generated. The history of Bell, in Page's view, was a tale not of 
industrial conquest but of technological virtuosity. Page found particularly 
objectionable Danielan's claim that Bell advertised only in those newspa-
pers that had editorialized in support of Bell. No business, large or small, 
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that engaged in the practice of "corrupting the press," Page moralized h 
a right to "live" in a democracy. Page was hardly the only Bell executi~ ad 
find Danielan's book outrageous; as late as 1962 one sympathetic ob e to 
. . . ,, . ' server 
recorded, it would remain anathema" cit B~ll. is 
While Page proudly celebrated Bell,,hls Bell Telephone System deliberate! 
downplayed the rather obvious differenCes bernreen the telephone giant ~ 
the nation's many smaller and less pow€:rful businesses. "The Bell Sys: 
has no political influence," Page famously, and erroneously, declared, "an~ 
wants none. "16 In making this misleadirig pronouncement, Page left unmen-
tioned the extent to which Bell had for decades lobbied state leoislatur 
. oA es 
and federal regulatory agencies. For Page, however, size simply did not mat-
ter; business was business, no matter ho~ large or small. NO longer did Page 
find it quite so unproblematic, as he had as recently as 1927, to distinguish 
betw'een giant corporations like Bell, whose management deliberately sub-
ordinated profit maximization to public service, and the many businesses 
for w:nch profit maximization remained the primary goal. The "day-to-day 
pract:J.ce of democracy," Page now .explained-indeed, the "essence of the 
American experiment" -was to be found in the world of work-making the 
Bell System a part of this "greatest of all human enterprises. "17 No longer, 
in short, did only certain businesses .have a social obligation.15 Henceforth, 
every business, regardless of size, and whatever its mandate, had an obliga-
tion to serve the public: "all business in a democratic country begins with 
public permission and exists by public approval. "19 
Page's ideas concerning the rel~tionship. of business an~ democracy 
would continue to evolve following his retirement from Bell. Now that he 
was an independent business consultant, rather than a Bell ex€:cutive, Page 
felt emboldened to generalize more broadly about the American experi-
ence. Every business, Page now contended, including even a highly regu-
lated govemment-sarictioned cartel like Bell, was· a voluntary association 
that owed its success to the same kind ofbottom-up grassroots social mobi-
lization for which the United States had been celebrated f~r over a century, 
and about which the French aristocrat Alexis de Tocqueville had writteri so 
perceptively iri his Democracy in America ( 1835; 1840). 
For Page to conceive of Bell as a voluntary association Seemed to him 
particularly apt, Although Bell was a creature of public policy, its manag-
ers coordinated a netw'ork of semiautonomous units that included a re-
search and development complex (Bell Labs), an equipment manufacturer 
(Western Electric), and a constellation of regionally based telephone op-
erating companies (the "Baby Bells"). A variant of the word "association" 
~S even part of the phrase that Bell publicists used when describing th~ 
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telephone giant: "American Telephone and Telegraph and the associated 
companies." 
Page's years at Bell shaped his ruminations on American history. Like the 
new social historians of the 1960s, Page believed that most historians paid 
far too much attention to government officials and far too little attention to 
the rest of the population. To be sure, Page was not interested, like so many 
of the new social historians, in shifting the locus of historical inquiry from 
the classes to the masses. Rather, he wanted to expand the masses to include 
virtually everyone who was ~ot a government official. And in particular, 
Page hoped to encourage scholarship on nongovernmental forms of col-
lective action, including, in particular, the voluntary association. Voluntary 
associations, in Page's view-rather than, say, legislatures or gov~ent 
agencies-best exemplified the shared aspirations of the many. · 
Page may never have read Louis Hartz's Liberal Tradition (1955), or, for 
that matter, any of the other American studies classics of the 1950s .. Even 
so, Page and the Americanists had a good deal in common. Both took it for 
granted that the American experience diverged sharply from a European 
norm, and that this divergence helped explain why American history was so 
distinctive-or, in the language of the day, "exceptional." Page's exceptional-
ism, like Hartz' s, was rooted in the colonial past. For Hartz, the absence of 
feudalism made American institutions distinctive; for Page, it was the weak-
ness of its government. Hartz regarded the absence of feudalism as a limit-
ing condition that generated a mindless liberalism that cut off American 
political thought from the intellectual heritage ofEuropean philosophy, For 
Page, weak government was a boon that empowered oidinary Americans, 
and, eventually, giant corporations, to generate material abundance on a 
scale that was altogether u~precedented in human history. 
The need for a revisionist history of the American past was, in Page's 
view, long overdue. History professors, Page lamented, vvrongly conflated 
American history with the history of its govemmei:;t rather than the history 
of its people. To identify a nation with its government would make a certain 
amount of sense for a constitutional monarchy such as Great Britain or a 
communist dictatorship such as the Soviet Union. Yet it was entirely inap-
propriate for the United States, a nation that lacked a feudal past and that, 
blessed as it had been with an abundance of land, had for over three cen-
turies provided ordinary people with '?PPOrtunities for economic advance-
ment unavailable anywhere else in the world. 
Nowhere was the myopia of American historians more obvious than in 
their neglect of the voluntary association. Incredibly, Page observed, the only 
professional historian to accord the voluntary association the significance 
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it deserved was Arthui- Schlesinger Sr., who had laid out his argument in "A 
Nation of Joiners," his 1944 presidential address to the American Historical 
~ssociation. In this address, Schlesinger praised the voluntary association 
as a nursery for the democratic values indispensable for a robust civil soci-
ety. "Considering the central importance of the voluntary organization in 
American history," Schlesinger declared, "there is no doubt it has provided 
the peo:Ple with their greatest school of self-government." No governmental 
institution-not even the storied New England town meeting about which 
Tocqueville had waxed so enthusiastic-could equal the voluntary associa-
tion as a training ground for civic engagement: "By comparison, the much 
vaunted. role of the New England town meeting as a seedbed of popular 
government seems almost negligible."20 
Page found it particularly notable that Schlesinger had taken pains to 
lump together as "voluntary associations" organizations that were con-
ventionally assumed to have had little in common. It was of great signifi-
cance, in Page's view, that Schlesinger saw no fundamental distinction 
betv.reen a membership-based organization such as a fraternal order and 
a management-led organization such as an industrial corporation.21 In the 
prewar period, historians had customarily put these Mo kinds of organiza-
tions into separate conceptual boxes: giant corporations were stand-ins for 
the few, or what was sometimes called the "interests"; fraternal orders for 
the many, or "the people." Business leaders knew better, and Page was de-
lighted that Schlesinger had followed their lead. 
Page applauded Schlesinger's address yet lamented that it h_ad fallen on 
deaf ears. Far more characteristic of the rising generation of historians1 in 
Page's view, was the relative indifference to civil society that -he detected 
in the New Deal-centric hagiography of Schlesinger's namesake and son, 
Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., who was at the time also a Harvard professor. 
Arthur Jr., Page complained to Wall Street banker Thomas W. Lamont in 
1957, was in the process of writing a laudatory history of the Roosevelt 
administration, an exercise that Page regarded as more appropriat~ for a 
historian of a monardly or a communist regime than for a historian of the 
United States.22 
The facility with which Schlesinger had elided the people-versus-the-
interests dichotomy in his 1944 address owed something to the historical 
moment in which it had been delivered. The United States in 1944 was 
at war, making it a patriotic imperative to emphasize the propensity of 
Americans from all walks of life-in business no less than in a fraternal 
order-to be "joiners" who enthusiastically pulled together for the pub-
lic good. In addition, it anticipated the more general shift of midcentury 
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public intellectuals away from political economy and toward civil society 
in the conviction that the horrors of Nazi and Soviet totalitarianism had 
fatally undermined the prewar identification of energetic government with 
the public good. 23 
Schlesinger's remarkably benign characterization of big business may 
also have owed at least something to the prewar corporate-funded "free en-
terprise" public relations campaign that business leaders had launched to 
undermine the moral foundations of the New Deal. This campaign had the 
support of several of the nation's most powerful corporations-though not 
Bell-and was spearheaded by a tight lmit group of corporate moguls that 
included Pierre S. and Irenee du Pont of the DuPont Chemical Company. 24 
Schlesinger himself was personally familiar with the free enterprise pub-
lic relations campaign, having served betvveen 1935 and 1938 as a paid 
consultant for the radio program Cavalcade of America-a DuPont-funded 
public relations pro_ject that deliberately downplayed controversial political 
issues in favor of edifying stories celebrating the ingenuity, self-reliance, and 
civic spirit of ordinary Americans. 25 · 
Page's faith in voluntarism was informed not only by his critique of 
the New Deal but also by his fear that the collectivist economic policy and 
egalitarian political ideology that were being aggressively championed in 
the Soviet Union by Communist Party officials might win the communists 
converts throughout Europe and around the world. To meet the challenge 
of Soviet collectivism, Page joined together with some of the country's lead-
ing bankers in 1947 to promote the Marshall Plan, an.ambitious govern-
ment project to use US capital to hasten Europe's postwar reconstruction. 
The Marshall Plan combined altruism with self-interest, since it presup-
posed that its beneficiaries would adopt economic policies supportive of 
US business interests and that US bankers would service the government's 
loans. Even so, it marked a sharp departure from the less interventionist 
policies that the federal government had embraced prior to the war. To com-
bat Soviet egalitarianism, Page supported the establishment of Radio Free 
Europe, an anti-Soviet propaganda organ that had been covertly funded 
though a CIA-backed front organization, the National Committee for a Free 
Europe. For the rest of his life Page would view American history though a 
Cold War lens, a mindset that obliged him to praise certain big government 
projects-for example, the Marshall Plan and Radio Free Europe-even as 
he criticized others as the misguided by-products of New Deal planners and 
Soviet apparatchiks. 
Page's idealization of the voluntary association fit well with the Cold 
War-era truism that robust voluntary associations were a counterweight 
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to big government and that big government stifled voluntary assoda-
tions. "The fact that we enjoy limited government to the extent we do II 
declared Sears executive James C. Worthy in a 1954 address before the 
Chicago City Club in a characteristic statement of this common belief 
could be explained "in no small part to the effectiveness of voluntary or~ 
ganizations."26 Worthy's definition of voluntary associations..,--like Page's, 
and, for that matter, Schlesinger's-was capacious. That is, it embraced not 
only membership-based organizations such as a religious denomination, 
but also a management-led organization such as the nation's most pow-
erful corporations. Each, Worthy believed, was a crucible of civic engage-
ment: "The individual citizen works with and through his church and his 
company much as he works with and through the many other voluntary 
organizations he has created to help serve the many purposes he demands 
be served. "27 
Page found Worthy's address on voluntary associations to be exception-
ally perceptive and took it upon himself to compliment Worthy 9n it in a 
personal letter that Page wrote in March 1957. Page's letter is worth consid-
ering in some detail, since it provides an unusually expansive exposition of 
Page's ideas regarding the relationship of government and business in the 
American past. 
"I have never seen as good an exposition of the voluntary association's 
influence on American life," Page wrote Worthy, "and I have long felt as you 
do, that it is one of the most characteristic and important elements in our 
democracy." In his own "desultory and amateur" reading of Americ~ his-
tory as it had been written by academically trained historians, Page added, 
he had seen but "one mention of this important subject," and that had been 
in Schlesinger's 1944 presidential address. 28 
Too many history professors, Page warned, adhered to the "British· idea" 
that the history of a country was a history of its government. This_ idea, 
Page explained, made sense for historians of the manY countries that were 
governed by a ruling class. Yet it was ludicrous for a historian of the United 
States. Page added that he had tried, largely unsuccessfully, to interest his-
tory professors in "recording the effect" of "personal liberty" in the United 
States. "I have a feeling," he confided to Worthy, "that if our academic world 
would lay the basis of understanding of our real history in the minds of 
college students, the next generation of leadership would be vastiy better 
equipped than our generation has been. "29 
To drive his point home, Page turned to history. The centrist "People's 
Capitalism" that flourished in the twentieth-century United States, Page 
explained-echoing a slogan that had been popularized by the probusiness 
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Advertising Council in the 1940s, and that would be embraced by President 
Dwight D. Eisenhower as a pillar of his administration's economic policy-
was a "logical later chapter" of the history of "_personal liberty," a history 
that Page traced back to the earliest settlements in colonial Virginia.30 When 
the :first colonists landed in Jamestown in 1607, Page observed, the great 
mass of the people of Europe worked as agricultural laborers for a landed 
aristocracy. In colonial America, in contrast, "owner farmers" prevailed. 
"There was land aplenty, which was opportunity aplenty," with widespread 
land ownership becoming the "original basis" of the "first real experiment 
in human history of personal liberty for the masses. "31 
Like Tocqueville, Page regarded the colonial era as the cradle of American 
values. Unlike Tocqueville, yet like so many of Page's fellow southerners, 
Page traced the origins of American democracy not to New England, but to 
Virginia. Distant English government officials tried to export a ruling class 
and to impose a feudal order, without success. As a Consequence, Virginians 
had the chance to exercise a greater sense of personal responsibility and 
"general altruism" than was possible at this time anywhere else in the world: 
"The Voluntary Association is the result. "32 
Page's glowing account of seventeenth-century Virginia is likely to startle 
anyone familiar with recent historical 'Writing on colonial America. After 
all, it ignored the centrality in Vrrginia of involuntary servitude, slavery, and 
Native Americans, topics that are now integral to its history. Yet it would be 
a mistake to dismiss his account as the ravings of a reactionary crank. For 
Page was no reactionary, at least by the standards of the day. Page supported 
government regulation of big business and believed that giant corporations, 
such as Bell, had an obligation to the public that transcended their obliga-
tion to their shareholders. For every business leader, Page reminded Worthy, 
public service, and not the maximization of shareholder value, must be their 
"first objective." This goal, Page was quick to add, was by no means _incom-
patible with the generation of large profits, which Page praised for creating 
the confidence, and the revenue stream, necessary for the socially responsi-
ble corporation to thrive.33 
Page's interest in the history of voluntary associations was stimulated 
by his conviction that Americans failed to recognize the democratic poten-
tial of the giant corporation. Here Page built on his own long-standing be-
lief as a public relations professional that the most effective form of public 
relations consisted neither of press releases, nor even of paid advertising 
and sponsored radio broadcasts, but rather in the meritorious conduct of 
the corporation's own employees. Every single corporation in the United 
States, Page lectured Worthy, had been chartered by a state legislature that 
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represented its people, presumably as "consumers." Corporations, thus, 
we_re a "servant of the public" that had been created by "public acr" and 
that owed their future to their continuing "good behavior." Yet no great 
enterprise could be expected to achieve the "good behavior" that its charter 
required by "merely trying to stay within the law." It was not enough, that 
is, to avoid the kind of monopolistic practices that had been prohibited 
by the Sherman Antitrust Act, one of the "great ena'ctments defining good 
behavior." Rather, the corporate good citizen, like the "personal" good citi-
zen, must have "wisdom, responsibility, and a belief in serving his fellow 
men": "Neither the corporation nor the individual can serve much without 
a profit, but each must know that serving the public is the first objective. "34 
Page elaborated on his vision of American history in numerous letters 
on the current state of history teaching that he wrote betvveen 1957 and 
1959. In these letters, Page urged opinion leaders to reframe the teaching 
of American history to foreground social factors, such as the social mobility 
of employees up the corporate ladder, and to marginalize political factors, 
such as the constraints on corporate management that the regulatory ap-
paratus of the federal government imposed. It was better, Page explained 
to banker Thomas S. Lamont, to study what people have done with their 
liberty, rather than the government nnder which they lived: "The people 
are the players. The government is the umpire. To understand the gaine it is 
better to watch the players rather than the umpire."35 It is my "firm belief,." 
Page informed Westinghouse executive Gwilym A. Price, that the student 
could not reach his "maximum" as an American citizen unless he under-
stood "how it happened that the people in the United States have re.iched 
a standard of living, a conception of voluntary association, and a habit of 
generosity far beyond other countries." Unfortunately, however, this civics 
lesson had yet to find its way into the classroom. On the contrary, under-
graduate history courses continued to forus narrowly on the history of the 
government, ignoring Tocqueville's arresting insight that the "health of a 
democratic society" could be "measured" by the "quality of functions per-
formed by private citizens."36 
Business management in the United States, Page explained to a chemical 
company executive, differed from business management in other countries 
to the extent that it was "dominated" by a "belief in opportunity for all" and 
committed to "responsibility for the general welfare." The distinctiveness of 
American corporate management, in tum, was "one of the most important 
aspects" of the "results ofliberty" in the United States: 'For had the corpo-
rate device been used to create a privileged class and reduce general oppor-
tunity, the results would have been quite different. "37 
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Page coupled his highly admiring acc~urn of business management 
with a sharply critical assessment of government grants for higher educa-
tion. Government grants for research and scholarships, Page warned an 
officer of the Carnegie Foundation in 1957, had become so ubiquitous 
that the professoriate was in danger of losing its intellectual autonomy. To 
wean the academy from its dangerous dependency on government largesse, 
Page believed, it needed a "dose of poverty. "38 Almost two decades before 
Lewis Powell would craft his 1971 memorandum, Page had become con-
vinced that the nation's leading colleges and universities were fast becom-
ing wards of the state. 39 Unlike Powell, however, Page chose to bore from 
within. Following the lead of the Chicago drugstore magnate Charles R. 
Walgreen-who in the 1930s had establi$hed a fonndation at the University 
of Chicago that, after his death, would nnderwrite the hiring of a topflight 
team of market-oriented professors to institutionalize the "Chicago school" 
of economics-Page worked within the system, rather than against it.40 
What the country needed, Page counseled Williams College president 
James P. Baxter, was the establishment with corporate funding of a beach-
head in the academy to remlnd the rising generation of the founders' 
conviction that "free men needed little government." For too long the pro-
fessoriate had adhered to the "English idea" that the history of a country was 
a history of its government. As a consequence, most Americans lmew only 
political history, rather than the "relations of business in a democracy." To 
remedy this disturbing omission, Page implored business leaders to fund 
historians willing to reframe the nation's history as a saga of "personal free-
dom" rather than as a ,,record of the activities of our govemment. 1141 
Page qualified his faith in corporate philanthropy with a realists' defer-
ence to the professoriate. Academic historians, Page freely conceded, had 
a "complete monopoly" of "propaganda in history," and he was "content· 
with that." Even the characterization of history as "propaganda" held no 
terrors for Page. Propaganda was nothing but "talking for a purpose." If 
communication lacked a purpose, everyone should remain silent. And since 
history was propaganda, Page's goal was simple: change the tune.42 
The reappraisal of American history that Page envisioned would, Page 
predicted, have salutary political consequences. If historians reframed the 
American past as a chronicle not of politics but of society, future elections 
would have "different results" than they had in 1932, when Roosevelt had 
bested Hoover, inaugurating the New Deal. The current, highly distorted 
liberal consensus on the American past had become an encumbrance not 
only for farmers, scientists, and church leaders but also for the many college 
graduates who went into business: "A historically well-educated industrial 
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leadership would never have needed [a] public relations counsel" such_ 
himself. 43 as 
Page's tenure at Bell had accustomed him to thinking in expansive terms 
about sponsored research, and his venture in historical revisionism was no 
exception. By sponsored research Page had in mind more than the publica-
tion of a stand-alone probusiness academic monograph, such as, for ex-
ample, an anti-Danielan history of the telephone industry. If Danielan had 
been Page's primary target, Page might well have confined himself to the 
preparation of a telephonic cousin to Forrest McDonald's revisionist biogra-
phy of electric power magnate Samuel Insull, a monograph that McDonald 
prepared with financial baddng from the electric power industry, and that 
would be published by the University of Chicago Press in 1962." To re-
frame American history, Page believed, would require, at a minimum, the 
establishment of at least one research institute at a prestigious university. To 
"spread" his "thesis" about the distinctiveness of the American experience, 
Page explained in 1957 to a public relations counsel at DuPont, he hoped 
to persuade a "great university" to establish a center for the "comparative 
study" of the fruits of liberty in the United States and around the world." 
The publications that such an institute generated, in tum, could be expected 
to influence a rising cohort Of historians, and, through them, the future gen-
erations of opinion leaders who attended their classes and read their books. 
The roots of American liberty, Page declared,· in a memorandum outlining 
his vision of the proposed research institute, were to be found neither in the 
arts nor literature, but instead in the production and distribution of g0ods 
and services, the "physical well being of the people," and the "voluntary 
association" of the people for the common good. A research institute dedi-
cated to the exploration of this theme, Page predicted, would overtime have 
a "pervasive effect" not only in the academy but also in the wider society. 45 
Page was well positioned to realize his goal. Although he had never held 
an academic appointment, he had served for several years in the 1950s as 
an elected trustee of the American Historical Association, a position that 
had introduced him to history professors throughout the country. Page's 
connections with his alma mater, Harvard University, were particularly 
strong. In addition to having graduated from the college, Page had for de-
cades been active in alumni affairs and was currently a university overseer. 
Page's backers at Harvard included the university librarian, and ex-provost, 
Paul H. Buck. Buck, himself a historian, had recently coauthored a Ford 
Foundation-funded study on the "Role of Education in American History," 
and was eager to seek out outside funding to boost historical research; pre-
dictably enough, he regarded Page's venture as a means to this end.47 
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To fund his venture, Page lobbied the leaders of some of the nation's 
largest and moSt powerful corporations. ~e mobilization of corporate phil-
anthropy for sponsored research was in no sense a new development in the 
1950s.48 The novelty of Page's venture lay, rather, in the self-assurance with 
which he linked corporate funding with the· reframing of historical writ-
ing on the American past. Academically trained historians, Page reminded 
General Motors executive Alfred P. Sloan, in a letter intended to elicit from 
Sloan a financial contribution for Page's institute, glorified the regulation of 
business by government "in such a manner as to leave the impression that 
business, particularly big business, is a menace to the nation. "49 For Page 
this was bunk; everyone who has "experienced the blessings of freedom 
in business" should be eaier to recruit historians to set the record straight. 
Sloan, for one, was unimpressed. "You pay your money and nothing hap-
pens," Sloan explained, in justification of his decision not to contribute: "I 
think it is money going down the drain. "50 
Sloan's misgivings notvvithstinding, Page's letter-¥lriting campaign bore 
fruit. In response to Page's request, the Richardson Foundation awarded 
a $40,000 grant to the History Department at the University of North 
Carolina to hire Elisha P. Douglass to write a history of American business, 
a project that resulted in the publication in 1971 ofDouglass's Coming of Age 
of American Business: Three Centuries of Enterprise, 1600-1900. An even larger 
grant arrived shortly thereafter from the Carnegie Foundation, a philan-
thropy on whose board Page served as a director. At Page's behest, the foun-
dation earmarked $200,000 to the Harvard History Department to establish 
a Center of the Comparative Study of Liberty, a sum equivalent to $1.6 mil-
lion in 2014 dollars. 51 The Carnegie grant was the first of several corporate 
grants that the Harvard center received. By 1961, for example, it would ob-
tain additional funding from the Eli Lilly Endowment, the United States 
Steel Foundation, the Kennecott Copper Foundation, and the Hudson Gas 
Corporation. 52 By this time, even the philanthropic foundation that bore 
Sloan's name had made a modest grant to help cover its costs.53 
Page regarded the establishment of the Harvard center as a personal 
coup and monitored its progress closely. Harvard might well be the most 
effective single source for the "creation and dissemination of ideas" in the 
educational world, Page gloated to Sloan, and the educational world was_ 
"unquestionably" the most effective "distributor" of ideas ~o the American 
people.54 
Page's institute opened at Harvard in 1958, with history professor Oscar 
Handlin as its first director. The Harvard center, whose name was soon short-
ened to the Center for the Study of Liberty in America, bore this name until 
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1966, when, following a hefty bequest from the widow of a prominent 1 .·.• aw-, 
yer and legal scholar, it was reorganized as the.Charles Warren Center, Which 
it remains today.55 Under Handlin's capable leadership, the center offered 
fellowships to tvventy-nine historians, many of whom would go on to dis-
tinguished careers. Among them were Bernard Bailyn, Rowland T. Berth.off 
Morton Keller, Leonard W Levy, Gerald D. Nash, William G. McLoughun: 
and Clarence L. Ver Steeg.56 Prominent scholars associated with the center 
in its early years included David Riesman, V 0. Key, Seymour Martin Lipset, 
and Willard Hurst.57 Along with the Davis Center at Princeton University, 
founded in 1968 by the investment banker Shelby Cullom Davis, the 
Harvard center would quickly establish itself as a seedbed for some of the 
most innovative historical scholarship in the country. 
Page's role at the center was confined primarily t~ its founding. Page 
remained in touch with Handlin until his death in 1960, but there is little 
evidence that he had any direct influence on the center's day-to-day ad-
ministration. Even so, it is suggestive that there remain"ed a distinct overlap 
between Page's political goals and the intellectual agenda for the center that 
were set forth in an early undated memoranda, "The Origins of American 
Freedom and What the People Have Done with It." Of the general themes 
that the memoranda put high on the center's agenda were two of special 
interest to Page: the "limited role of the state" and "voluntary modes of ac-
tion" in religious, economic, cultural, and philanthropic organizations.58 
Among the specific topics that Page would have found appealing wer~ the 
business corporation as a volunta1}' association, 1840-1900, and the rejection 
of government ownership of the "telephone system" in the 1910s.59 
While this memorandum suggests that the center's intellectual agenda 
was compatible with Page's political goals, several of Page's correspondents 
remained unconvinced. It had been a mistake, they predicted, for Page to 
have located his institute at Harvard, since, under Handlin's direction, it 
was certain to stray from Page's political goals. Three of the members of 
the center's advisory committee, sputtered the conservative Northwestern 
University political scientist Kenneth W. Colegrove, were Jevvish, including 
Handlin, while Handlin and Riesman were socialists: "I would not object to 
one or two Jews. But three are altogether too many on a committee of that 
size .... There is no balance." To make matters worse, the center's steering 
committee did not include a single Catholic, even though Catholics were 
"deeply interested in Iiberty."60 Anti-Jewish sentiment inside the academy 
remained strong, especially among conservatives, as did hostility to social-
ism, making it seem inconceivable for Colegrove to entrust academics from 
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such a background and who held such political views with the sacred task 
of promoting the cause of liberty in a hostile world. 
Page responded to Colegrove's critique in a letter to Williams College 
president James P. Baxter. Page conceded to Baxter that he did not know 
personally any of the members of the committee other than Buck and 
Handlin. Even so, Page did not believe that they could be "anti-liberty or 
anti-American" if they had been chosen by Buck• "If you knew these men 
will you call me on the telephone or write me in confidence what you think 
of them as a committee for the Center?"61 
If Baxter responded to Page's inquiry, no record of it survives. Yet in 
certain respects, Colegrove's critique was on the mark. The Harvard center 
would devote scant attention to the libertarian legacy of colonial Virginia, 
a favorite topic of Page's, while it lavished funding on the preparation by 
Handlin and his coauthor and vvife Mary F. Handlin of the Dimensions of 
Liberty, a prospectus of the center's research agenda that linked the elab-
oration of voluntary associations in the twentieth century with the expan-
sion of the federal government, a conclusion that Page would have almost 
certainly deplored.62 Unlike Page, the Handlins traced the origins of the 
"system of free private enterprise" not to the colonial era, but, rather, to 
the mid-nineteenth century, when antimonopolists wary of special privi-
lege articulated a "liberal demand" for the divorce of the state from the 
economy. 53 And unlike Page the Handlins regarded the "key relation" in 
the modem corporation to be not the public-mindedness of its manage-
ment but the "voluntary membership" of its shareholders through their 
"investment .in capital stock."54 On one critical issue, however, the Handlins 
and Page agreed: the corporation was a voluntary association, even though, 
the Handlins candidly conceded, Americans until quite recently had only 
rarely described it in these terms. The unwillingness of earlier generations of 
Americans to conceive of the corporation in this way was for the Handlins 
easily explained: nineteenth-century Americans typically characterized the 
corporation as "private" rather than "voluntary," since they lumped it to-
gether with the religious denomination, a "private entity" that operated out-
side of the purview of the state. 65 
Page responded to his critics by underscoring the affinities between the 
center's work and the probusiness agenda that had been for him its pri-
mary rationale. To make his point, Page adopted a somewhat more self-
consciously boosterish vocabulary than would have been customary for a 
Bell executive, or even a Bell director, which Page would remain for many 
years following his offidal retirement from Bell. The fundamental ideal that 
'' ! ; 
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the center had been established to promote, Page now averred, was the cen. 
trality to American history not merely of the voluntary association but of 
"free enterprise." Page's reference to "free enterprise" was something of 
. a 
new departure; during his many years at Bell, for example, he had pointedly 
refused to link the telephone giant 'With the "free enterprise" crusade. Now 
that he was longer constrained by his corporate position, Page embraced the 
new terminology with the fervor of a true believer. Neither the Handlins' 
Dimensions of Liberty, Page conceded to Lamont, nor Handlin's annual re. 
port as the center's director, would "I think, satisfy the gentlemen on the far 
right who distrust Harvard's fundamental belief in free enterprise." Neither, 
after all, declared "flatly," as would Page, that free enterprise was the "real 
basis of America's greatness." Even so, having talked with Handlin, Page 
remained convinced that by the time the ceiiter was finished 'With its "aca-
demic evolutions" the "result 'Will be good."65 
In no sense was Page the originator of the center's emphasis on voluntary 
action and small government. Llke so many prominent specialists in public 
relations, Page was more of a popularizer than an original thinker. American 
historians had been lamenting the narrow focus of their field on political 
history for decades, with periodization schemes organized around presi-
dential administrations-the so-called and much-ridiculed presidential 
synthesis-being a particular focus for critique. Even so, Page's agenda would 
cast a long shadow on the professoriate. Harvard exercised more influence 
nation'Wide over the training of graduate students in American history in 
the 1960s than it does today, and Handlin was one of the nation's preemi-
nent mentors of the rising generation of American historians. Several of the 
historians who received center fellowships, including Rowland T. Berthoff, 
Gerald D. Nash, and Morton Keller, would go on to write extensively on 
the history of government-business relations. Berthoff and Keller, though 
not Nash, viewed this topic-like Page-primarily through the lens of civil 
society rather than political economy. Handlin's influence on this cohort of 
historians was forcibly impressed upon me a few years ago when, in a con-
versation 'With Jack N. Rakove, a Stanford University political historian who 
had obtained a PhD in history from Harvard in 1975, I asked what book 
he recommended as an overview of nineteenth-century American govern-
ment; Rakove unhesitatingly proposed the Handlins' Dimensions of Liberty." 
Fittingly, the Handlins' dedicated this book to Page, who had died shortly 
before its publication, as a "Friend of Liberty and of Learning. "58 It was Page, 
they elaborated in their acknowledgments, who had first conceived the idea 
of a "sustained scholarly effort" to "describe the character of American free 
institutions": "We only regret that he did not live to see the appearance of 
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the first fruits of a project dose to his interests. "59 Handlin reiterated his 
indebtedness to Page in a letter to Bell board chairman Frederick R. Kappel 
that Handlin vvrote shortly after Page's death. "Our center," Handlin de-
clared, "owes its existence to the interest of Mr. Arthur W. Page. "10 
Dimensions of Liberty remains the single-best overview of the center's in-
tellectual agenda. The study of liberty in all its facets, the Handlins con-
tended, was but a "single subject": how was it that "men pursued their 
hopes for achievement by cooperating voluntarily or by cons€:ntini to be 
govemed."71 Voluntary cooperation, in turn, entailed the establishment of 
voluntary associations, which had sometimes served the ends of the state 
but which also, and more importantly, has offered an "alternative" to it-
making it an "essential factor" in the "development" of American liberty. 72 ~, 
The tone of Dimensions, as one might expect, given the intellectual cli-
mate out of which it had emerged, was full of foreboding. Like Page, the 
Handlins found the simmering Cold War between the United States and the 
Soviet Union deeply troubling and were far from sanguine about the future. 
"The preservation of liberty," they proclaimed in their opening sentence, 
"is the preeminen't problem of our times." The worldwide spread of free-
dom that once seemed destined to "spread toward horizons of inde:firtj.~e 
extension" had come to be threatened by "hostile forces of overvvhelming 
power" -by which they meant the Soviet Union and it allies. And the emer-
gence of a threat of such magnitude raised the question of whether the po-
litical philosopher Isaiah Berlin might indeed have been correct when he 
claimed that the idea of freedom might soon become a mere curiosity. 73 
Such considerations, the Handlins added, had led them to establish the 
center in 1958.74 
One project that Handlin hoped the center would sponsor was never 
consummated. Between 1960 and 1963, Handlin worked closely with fac-
ulty members at Northwestern University and the Harvard Business $chool 
to lay the groundwork for a major, archivally based history of the Bell 
System. Whether or not Page had suggested this project is uncertain. It is not 
inconccivable that Handlin, as a savvy administrator, made it a priority fol-
lo'Wing Page's death in 1960 in order to perpetuate the center's relationship 
with Bell. What can be confidently asserted is that the project dated back to 
1958, a period in which Page's relationship to the center was particularly 
dose,.and eventuated, following Page's death, in a November 1961 meeting 
at Bell's baronial headquarters at 195 Broadway in New York City at which 
both Handlin and Bell board chairman Frederick R. Kappel were present. 
"Very little of a constructive character," Kappel had lamented the previous 
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been "written recently" about the early history of his company, and "practi-
cally nothing at all in a scholarly vein." The Handlin-Kappel meeting had 
been set up to help remedy this situation. 75 
Handlin's rationale for the proposed telephone history echoed themes 
Page had long championed. It would be particularly ,yaluable, Handlin be-
lieved, to explore the abortive movement to nationalize the telephone in-
dustry in the 1910s. "Such a history," Handlin wrote, in a memorandum on 
his meeting at 19 5 Broadway, "would throw light on some of the important 
subjects of concern to the Center, particularly on the role of voluntary as-
sociations in the economy and on the distinction of public from private 
spheres of activity." Two developments related to the position of Bell as a 
private enterprise seemed to Handlin to be particularly worthy of investiga-
tion. They were the circumstances that "permitted" the telephone in the 
United States to remain a "free private enterprisen at a time when the me-
dium was being absorbed by the state in much of the rest of the world, and 
the shift in American public opinion between 1900 and 1920 that led to 
the recognition that "private was preferable to governmental operation in 
this sphere. "75 
Much depended, of course, on the identity of the author of the proposed 
study. Handlin confided to a Bell executive that he anticipated that the study 
might be written by someone like Harold C. Passer, whose publications 
included a monograph on the late nineteenth-century electrical manufac-
turing business, or Morton Keller, author of a sympathetic biography of the 
arch.conservative early twentieth-century corporate lawyer James M. Beck. 
David Riesman suggested E. Digby Baltzell, a sociologist who had recently 
published a historically oriented analysis of Philadelphia's Protestant elite.77 
The proposed telephone history never got off the ground, falling victim, 
as would so many similar business histories from this period, to the scru-
ples of in-house corporate lawyers fearful of the potentially adverse antitrust 
implications of a full public disclosure of their past business activities.78 Yet 
its rationale does highlight a dimension of liberty that Page's own historical 
writings deliberately concealed. Like so many giant corporations, Bell was as 
much a creature of government regulation as it was the by-product of mar-
ket incentives and technological imperatives. This was a fact that Page's stark 
opposition between political economy and civil society had done much to 
obscure. 
The court-ordered dismantling of the Bell System in 1984 underscored 
the limitations of Page's vision of American history. The Bell System had 
been a victim less of government giantism run amok than of an antimonop-
oly deregulatory movement that rejected the politically inflected regulatory 
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compromises that Page,· as -the _longtime head of Bell's formidable public 
relations machine, had worked so diligently and for so long to defend. Bell 
-had indeed been an association of corporations, yet in no sense was this as-
sociation voluntary. On the contrary, it owed its existence to a constellation 
of intricate political compromises concerning rate structures and service 
standards.79 Voluntarism was, and is, a social process rather than a moral 
imperative, a means rather than an end. To make voluntarism a centerpiece 
of historical analysis, as Page had, was ultimately to obscure its ernbedded-
ness in a political·economy that had the potential, as Page had recognized 
all along, to repudiate the compromises upon which the corporation that 
he had long championed had been built. 
The legacy of Page's mobilization of corporate philanthropy on historical 
writing is diffuse, yet multifaceted. The kind of social history that Page tried 
to encourage was obviously different from the self-consciously radical and 
antiestablishment new sod~ history that emerged at roughly the same time 
at the University of Wisconsin. The new social history had l!lany sources, 
including some that were transnational, and its implications Were not eas-
ily contained.80 Even so, Page's project and the new social history had more 
in common than one might at first surmise. Each Warned portentously that 
the current generation of academic historians had egregiously distorted th~ 
historical record; each held a dim view of the state; and each placed great 
faith in the wisdom of the masses, even as they differed widely as to who· 
the ffiasses were and why they mattered. Or, to put it somewhat differently, 
it is worth recalling that the enthusiasm for civil society by social historians 
has a somewhat more complicated lineage than is often assumed, and that 
at least part of their fascination with voluntary associations, social mobil-
ity, history from the "bottom up, n and the large percentage of Americans 
whose names never found their way into the newspaperS, was indebted to 
Page's efforts to promote a style of historical ml.ting that would skew the 
boundary between state and society so far from political economy and to-
ward civil society as to render governmental i_nstitutions largely irrelevant to 
the American past. 
The legacy of Page's center on historical vvriting at Harvard is even more 
direct. It remains a matter of record that several of the most gifted American 
historians in Handlin's orbit during the 1960s, induding Gordon S. Wood 
and Morton Keller, popularized an approach to the study of the relationship 
of government and society that Page would have found congenial. Among 
the habits of mind these historians shared was a skeptical attitude toward the 
··,·, 
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early American state as an agent of change. Wood's Pulitzer Prize-Win . 
Radicalism of the American Revolution (1991) marginalized the Federa~ 
and the governmental institutions they established, contending that ~ '' 
Thomas Jefferson's victory in the presidential election of 1800 the u' ~ '\ 
. . . ' n1ted 
States turned deas1vely away from the statlst project that the Federali 
had endorsed. Keller, similarly, has remained consistent over many sts, 
. h. . th . Years In 1s contenuon at the nineteenth-century American state was ex 
. ceed~ 
1nglyweak, that the political "regime" the Jacksonians established remaine,d 
pretty much in place until the New Deal, and that the New Deal marked a . 
sharp and ITTevocable rupture in American public life. a1 
The legacy of Page's center can also be traced, albeit more ambiguous} 
in Bernard Bailyn's Pulitzer Prize-'Winning Ideological Origins of the Americ! 
Revolution (1967), one of the great works of historical scholarship to be pub-
lished in the 1960s. The seed for Ideological Origins lay in an essay that Bailyn 
prepared as the introduction to a projected four-volume collection of pam-
phlets written by American colonists on the eve of the War of Independence. 
This volume, which Bailyn dedicated to Handlin, and which grew out of a 
project on early American politics that Bailyn had worked on at the center, 
was introduced by a remarkable essay that would be later expanded and 
published as Ideological Origins, in which Bailyn set forth a compelling and 
highly influential explanation for the American Revolution. 82 In the revised 
version of this essay, Bailyn elaborated in luminous prose and with great 
insight on the fundamentally antistatist u contagion of liberty" in the 1770s 
that propelled the founders of the American republic to transform a mod-
erate critique of the British state into a far more radical assault on slavery, 
religious establishments, and social hierarchy. The revolution, in short, at 
least in its opening phase, was an epic struggle betw'een liberty and power in 
which liberty won. The "primary goal" of the Revolution, Bailyn declared, in 
an oft-quoted passage, was 0 the preservation of political liberty threatened 
by the apparent corruption of the constitution, and the establishment in 
principle of the existing conditions of liberty. "83 It would not be until many 
years later, in an expanded edition of Ideological Origins that included a new 
chapter on the ideological contest of the 1780s, that Bailyn would empha-
size the constructive state-building role of the founders, an elaboration that 
can be read as a critique not only of Wood's Radicalism, but also of Wood's 
earlier Creation of the American Republic, which had been publlshed in 1968, 
a mere two years follovving the reorganization of the center in 1966.84 
Handlin remained committed to the completion of a full-scale history 
of liberty in the United States, a project for which he regarded Dimensions 
of Liberty as the prolegomena. This ambitious project eventually came to 
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fruition with the publication between 1986 and 1994 of a hefty four-volume 
history of "liberty 'in America" from 1600 to the present that Handlin coau-
thored with his second wife, Lillian, Mary having died in 1976." By the time 
these sprawling tomes found their way into print, Handlin's well-honed 
combination of oracular pronouncements with pointillistic detail was no 
- longer in vogue, while the intellectual agenda that Handlin had champi-
oned in Dimensions of Liberty had become unmanageably diffuse. The vol-
umes received mixed reviews from their colleagues, several of whom forused 
on the problematic definitfon of its theme. "One lesson of this book," wrote . 
a reviewer of volume four in the American Historical Review, was that 
0
any 
seemingly neutral definition pf liberty such as 'ability to act' is not feasible": 
"The content of action is inseparable from the ability to act."86 
Historians in the.1960s shifted their attention from political economy 
to civil society for a multitude of reasons that had nothing to do with the 
establishment ofH~d's Center for the Study ofLib€:rty. Even so, it would 
be a mistake to discount the influe!!Ce of corporate philanthropy upon his-
torical 'Writing. In an age when research support for historical research was 
less generous that it would later become, cultural entrepreneurs like Page 
had the opportunity, as thdounding of the Harvard center demonstrates, 
to shape an intellectual agenda that would leave an imprint on some of the 
leading historians of the age. 
The Harvard center was but one of several research institutes founded 
in the 1950s to combat the New Deal. The Hagley Museum and Library in 
Wilmington, Delaware, an organization dedicated to the study of American 
business and technological history that received generous funding from 
the Du Pont family, had a similar rationale, as did the foundation at the 
University of Chicago established by drugstore magnate Charles R. Walgreen. 
The eponymous lecture series that Walgreen's foundation establish~d even-
tuated in the publication of several notable history books, including David 
M. Potrer's People of Plenty (1954), a nuanced yet ultimately sympathetic 
analysis of American~ economic abundance that discounted the agency of 
governmental institutions in bringing this abundance about.87 The Davis 
Center for Historical Research at Princeton had an analogous genealogy. 
Funded by investment banker Shelby Cullom Davis, it championed social 
history over political hist6ry at a time when bankers like Davis, a movement 
conservative active in conservative think tanks, had good reason to be wary 
of the state. 88 
To document the influence of politically motivated corporate philan-
thropy on the funding ofhist9rical scholarship does not, of course, impugn 
the scholarship that this philanthropy helped to sustain. Yet it does deepen 
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our understanding of the intensity of the post-Second World War business 
crusade against the New Deal, while serving as a pointed reminder of the 
extent to which the boundary berw-een state and society in the American 
past has long been a subject not only of dispassionate historical inquiry but 
also of polemical contestation and debate. 
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